

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 2001 2:35 PM

2001 SEP 13 PM 12: 2

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: General Jones
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq

Thanks so much for your memo of August 31. I am working the problem and certainly agree with your concern.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/31/01 CMC memo to SecDef re: Iraq

DHR:dh
091001-39

Declassified By, Chief, WHS Records & Declass Div, ESD
IAW E012958



~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



~~Secret~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

See my memo to WSC 7/27/01

IN REPLY REFER TO:

1000

CMC

31 Aug 01

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subj: U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES IN IRAQ

1. It is my opinion that our current strategy of responding to Iraqi provocations, threats, and actions with limited attacks by Operation Southern and Northern Watch aircraft is a high risk strategy without clear objectives or a discernable end state. The negligible effect on the Iraqi leadership as well as the effect on our Arab allies is at odds with the risk we are taking. Sooner or later, either by mechanical failure or hostile action, one or more of our aircrews will be killed or captured over Iraqi territory. We have been fortunate to date but we cannot, in my view, continue in this manner indefinitely at an acceptable level of risk.
2. As we have discussed in the past our military response options are being limited by host nation concerns and by our own delicate position vis-à-vis the Israel, Palestinian and Arab world relationship. The result is a "tit-for-tat" approach that is at odds with our status as a great power. It is also an approach that is not working in halting the risk to our aircrews and one that has the added downside of alienating many within the Arab world.
3. Our response to Iraqi attack has become all too routine. It has become a campaign without purpose. The cycle of attack and response is being repeated without debate among our national security leaders and without a clear appreciation of its long term impact on our interests in the region. I would welcome additional discussions at future JCS meetings on this subject. We need to ensure that the risk we are directing our aircrews to take is consistent with the end state we desire to achieve. I would appreciate your consideration of my position as non-concurring with our current military response options.
4. I look forward to discussing and formulating a strategy that will allow us to create a more effective military response to consistent Iraqi provocations.

J. L. Jones
J. L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



~~Secret~~